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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROSECUTOR's DUTY
TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE TO THE DEFENSE-

Boteler v. State, 363 So. 2d 279 (Miss. 1978).

On July 23, 1976, E. L. Boteler resigned from his position as director of the Mississippi State Highway Department. Subsequently,
Boteler was tried and convicted by a jury on two counts of embezzlement in the circuit court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County,
Mississippi.,
On appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court the defendant contended that the prosecution defied the circuit judge's order for
discovery by failing to give the defense counsel notes of a statement
made by the defendant to a state witness.2 The statement in question
involved notes taken by the director of a legislative audit committee
during an interview with the defendant six days after the defendant
had resigned as director of the Mississippi Highway Department.' The
notes allegedly showed that the defendant told the audit committee
director a story different from the one he told from the witness stand.
During the trial, this information was used by the prosecution to
undermine the defendant's credibility by showing the jury that the
4
defendant's prior statement contradicted his sworn testimony.
At the trial the state conclusively established, and the defendant
conceded, that he had caused state funds to be issued to a fictitious entity and then used the funds for his personal benefit., The defendant,
however, testified that the money was issued to repay him for money
he had previously advanced to the highway department for the purpose of funding a lobbying effort in Washington. 6 Therefore, "the only issue at trial became Mr. Boteler's credibility, as it reflected upon
the state of his mind and the existence or lack of criminal intent." 7
The defendant based his appeal on the due process prohibition of
'Boteler v. State, 363 So. 2d 279 (Miss. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U. S. L. W. 3742
(1979). Defendant was indicted on a third charge of embezzling $100,000, but was not
tried on this count.
'Id. at 283.
Prior to trial the defense counsel filed a motion for discovery and inspection which
was granted by the circuit court judge. The motion, in pertinent part, called for the
state to provide the defendant with "any relevant written or recorded statement or confession made by defendant or copies thereof within the possession, custody or control of
the State of Mississippi, the existence of which is known or by the exercise of due
diligence, may be known to the attorneys for the State of Mississippi." Brief for Appellant at 39, 363 So. 2d 279 (Miss. 1978).
'363 So. 2d at 283.
lid.

Sld. at 281.
Old.
'Id. at 283.
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prosecutorial suppression of evidence found in Brady v. Maryland."
Boteler argued that the failure of the prosecution to disclose the notes
violated a constitutional duty to reveal inculpatory, as well as exculpatory evidence.'
The Mississippi Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Boteler's
conviction citing United States v. Agurs" which held that the prosecution does not have a constitutional duty to routinely deliver its entire
file to the defense counsel." The court elaborated by stating that the
proper standard in judging "Brady material" should be the materiality of the evidence to the issue of guilt or innocence rather than the
impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to
prepare his defense.' 2 The latter standard was held to be unacceptable
by the court because it would "encompass incriminating evidence as
enwell as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor's
'
3
defense."
the
planning
in
useful
be
always
tire case would
PROSECUTORIAL DISCLOSURE

The prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose evidence to the
defendant has evolved from a long line of cases, beginning with
Mooney v. Holohan.4 In Mooney the defendant applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, charging that his conviction for murder was obtained
by the prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony.' s The
United States Supreme Court condemned such conduct, stating that
the due process requirement has not been met
Boteler contended that a defendant in an embezzlement case can rely on proof that
he acted in good faith as an absolute defense to the charges against him. See Commonwealth v. Schad, 218 Pa. Super. 359, 280 A.2d 655, 657 (1971); Commonwealth v.
Wiener, 340 Pa. 369, 17 A.2d 357, 360 (1941); which held that the test is "not whether
the defendant had the right to withhold this money but whether in good faith he believed he had such right." Id.
'373 U. S. 83 (1963).
'363 So. 2d at 284.
"0427 U. S. 97 (1976).
"363 So. 2d at 284-85.
The Mississippi Supreme Court did not discuss the assignment of error raised in the
defendant's brief that the court order required delivery of the material sought regardless
of the constitutional requirement. It can only be presumed that the "relevant material"
standard is no broader than the constitutional requirements.
"I1d. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97, 112 n.20 (1976)).
"1363 So. 2d at 285 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S.97, 112 n. 20 (1976)).
The opinion concluded that for a number of reasons the defendant's right to a fair trial
was not violated by a failure to disclose the notes to him. The first reason was that the
notes by themselves, without the benefit of explanation from the person who wrote
them, do not reveal either inculpatory or exculpatory evidence. Second, the pretrial
discovery order was not sufficient to require the prosecution to reveal the notes to the
defendant. Finally, the defendant was put on notice of the notes' existence since he saw
the notes being written during the interview.
"294 U. S. 103 (1935).
"Id. at 110.
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if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretence of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty
through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of
testimony known to be perjured. Such a contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent
with the rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation.'6

In Pyle v. Kansas," the Court broadened the ruling by not only
condemning the knowing use of perjured testimony, but also explicitly stating that the deliberate suppression of evidence favorable to the
defendant is "a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Federal Con... "6In two subsequent cases the Mooney standard was
stitution.
again expanded, although somewhat conservatively. In Alcorta v.
Texas," the Supreme Court condemned the prosecutor's knowing
failure to correct perjured testimony relating solely to the issue of
punishment. Then in Napue v. Illinois,20 the Court found a denial of
due process when the prosecutor knowingly failed to correct unsolicited perjured testimony that related solely to the credibility of a

state witness.
The development from Mooney to Napue constituted the first

stage in the evolution of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to
disclose evidence to the defendant. In these cases the prosecutor's
misconduct was the principal basis for a finding of a due process
violation.

The focus changed during the second stage of the case law
development with the landmark case of Brady v. Maryland.2' In
Brady the court for the first time directly addressed the issue of the
fairness of the trial to the defendant. Brady specifically emphasized
that the critical element in disclosure is the impact of nondisclosure
upon the fairness of the proceeding, holding that the "good faith" or
"bad faith" of the prosecution is irrelevant in the issue of due
process.2 2 The court elaborated on its holdings by stating that the
of a
underlying principle "is not punishment of society for misdeeds
2
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.- 1
'11d. at 112. However, the writ of habeas corpus did not issue since the defendant
had not exhausted all remedies available to him under state law. Id. at 113-15.
"1317U. S. 213 (1942).
"Id. at 216.
"9355 U.S. 28 (1957).
-360 U.S. 264 (1959). In the opinion the Court held that a new trial is required if
"the false testimony could.. .in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgement
of the jury." Id. at 27 1.
"1373 U.S. 83 (1963).
121d. at 87. "We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution." Id.

21Id.
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Four years later, in Giles v. Maryland,2" the Supreme Court was
faced with its first post-Brady suppression case. In Giles the introduc26
tion of new evidence,2 5 plus the suppression of favorable evidence,
was sufficient basis for the Court to remand the case to determine
whether the due process rights of the petitioner had been violated.2 7
Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, attempted to define a broad
standard for disclosure. The Justice stated that "the state's obligation
is not to convict, but to see that, so far as possible, truth emerges. 26 1 In
elaborating, Justice Fortas appeared to support the disclosure of all
evidence except information which is "merely repetitious,
cumulative, or embellishing of facts otherwise known to the defense
... , or without importance to the defense for purposes of the preparation of the case." 21 It is also important to note that Justice Fortas
believed that in judging an alleged due process violation it should be
immaterial whether or not a request was made for the suppressed
evidence. He stated: "I see no reason to make the result turn on the
adventitious circumstances of a request. If the defense does not know
of the existence of the evidence, it may not be able to request its production. A murder trial-indeed any criminal proceeding-is not a
2 30
sporting event."
In 1972, the Court directed its attention to a clear example of a
"good faith" suppression of evidence in Giglio v. United States."' In
Giglio, the trial prosecutor was unaware that the previous assistant
U. S. attorney had promised a key prosecution witness immunity from
government prosecution.32 Since he was unaware of the earlier agreement, the prosecutor did not correct a false statement concerning the
promise during the trial.32 Nevertheless, in spite of the prosecutor's
good faith, the Court ordered a new trial.3 ' The Court, quoting from
the Napue opinion, stated that "a new trial is required if 'the false
testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the
judgment of the jury .... ' "M Hence, Giglio reaffirmed the Brady rule
24386

U.S. 66 (1967).

"Id. at 74. The new information consisted of interviews with the rape victim which
were inconsistent with the victim's trial testimony.
"Id. at 70-71. The evidence allegedly suppressed consisted of: 1) information that a
caseworker had advised that the rape victim be placed on probation; 2) a report that the
victim had a sexual encounter with two men five weeks after the alleged rape, followed
by the filing and eventual withdrawal of a rape charge; and 3) facts concerning a hearing in which the victim was committed to a girl's school.
"Id.at 74.
"Id. at 98. The majority opinion did not deal with the materiality issue.
2d.

"Id. at 102.
"405 U.S. 150 (1972).
"Id. at 152.
"Id. at 152-53.
'Id. at 155.
'Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264. 271 (1959)).
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that the principal basis for a finding of due process violation will be
the fairness of the trial to the defendant and not the prosecutor's
misconduct. Yet, in the next suppression case, Moore v. Illinois,16 the
Court appeared to focus more on the strength of th6 prosecutor's case,
than upon the fairness of the trial in judging the undisclosed evidence.
In Moore, the defendant contended he was denied due process in
his trial for murder because the prosecution failed to reveal that one
of the witnesses had "misidentified" the defendant. The Supreme
Court affirmed the conviction by concluding that the evidence suppressed was not sufficiently material to justify a new trial." The
Court stated that two eyewitnesses had positively identified the defendant as the killer and that none of the items allegedly withheld by the
prosecution impeached that identification.3" The dissent,39 however,
felt that the suppressed evidence might "have been of substantial
assistance to the defense, ' ' 40 and the failure to disclose the evidence
denied the defendant a fair trial."' In explaining the need for a
broader duty of disclosure, Justice Marshall said that "while frivolous
information and useless leads can be ignored, if evidence is clearly
relevant and helpful to the defense, it must be disclosed." ' Justice
Marshall, as Justice Fortas had done in Giles, was once again
recognizing the need for the prosecution to reveal all helpful evidence
to the defendant so that he can properly prepare his defense.
AGURS DISCLOSURE STANDARDS

In 1976, the Supreme Court decided the most important non-

disclosure case since Brady, United States v. Agurs.'" The case

represents the third stage in the development of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose evidence to the defendant. Agurs is basically an accumulation and clarification of the different rules established
since the Mooney decision. The court of appeals, reversing the district
court, had held that the prosecution's failure to disclose certain
evidence was a due process violation and required a new trial because
the evidence "might have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt
about appellant's guilt."" The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the court of appeals had incorrectly interpreted the Brady rule and
therefore had applied a wrong standard of review.4 '5 The correct rule,
3'408

U.S. 786 (1972).

"Id. at 796-98.
111d. at 796-97.
"Id. at 800 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Stewart, Powell, JJ.).
"Id. at 801.

"Id.
"Id. at 809.
"'427 U.S. 97 (1976).
"Id. at 1253 (quoting Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F. 2d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
"427 U.S. at 102.
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the Court said, is that a reversible error has occurred "if the omitted
evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist."'-4
Applying this rule to the circumstances, the Court decided that the
suppressed evidence did not create a reasonable doubt in the context
of the entire record. The Court explained that the defendant's prior
criminal record which had not been disclosed by the prosecution did
not contradict any evidence offered by the prosecutor."
in Agurs the Court outlined the circumstances under which
evidence must be disclosed to the defense. The Court stated that the
Brady rule arguably applies in three different situations."
.The first situation, as in Mooney,"' involves perjured testimony. If
the perjured testimony is included in the prosecution's case, a new
trial should be ordered "if there is any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. "30 Under
this standard there will be an extremely strict duty on the prosecution
to disclose this type of evidence. The Court indicated a strong disapproval of the use of perjury by the prosecution because it involves "a
corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.""s
The second situation, typified by the facts in Brady,' involves the
type of case in which the defense has made a specific request for information. In this category, the Court reasoned that "the [prosecutor's]
3
failure to make any response is seldom, if ever, excusable.'
The third situation involves the category of cases where the prosecutor has received no request at all or receives only a general request
for "Brady material." In this situation, exemplified by Agurs, the
Court held that the duty to disclose arises only "if the evidence is so
clearly supportive of a claim of innocence that it gives the prosecution
notice of a duty to produce ...."54 In other words, "the prosecutor
will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his
omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the
defendant's right to a fair trial.""5
"1d. at 112.
"1d. at 114.
"d. at 103.
"See note 14 and accompanying textual material, supra.
1*427 U.S. at 103.
"Id. at 104.
"Id. In Agurs the Court noted that, "a fair analysis of the holding in Brady indicates
that implicit in the requirement of materiality is a concern that the suppressed evidence
Id.
might have affected the outcome of the trial."
3Id. at 106. The Court elaborated by saying:
[Alithough there is, of course, no duty to provide defense counsel with unlimited
discovery of everything known by the prosecutor, if the subject matter of such a
request is material, or indeed if a substantial basis for claiming materiality exists,
it is reasonable to require the prosecutor to respond either by furnishing the information or by submitting the problem to the trial judge.

Id.
"Id. at 107.
"Id.

at 108.
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The Court concluded:
[TJhe proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible
only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a
reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has
been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the
context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt,
whether or not the additional evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial."8

APPLYING AGURS TO BOTELER

In applying the Agurs standard of materiality to the facts in
Boteler v. State, 7 the second standard appears applicable, although
the Mississippi Supreme Court applied the third standard. The second
standard is exemplified by the facts in Brady. In Brady, the defense requested the prosecution to disclose all of a co-defendant's extrajudicial statements. The prosecution failed to disclose one of these
statements. The Supreme Court held that the nondisclosure constituted a due process violation and hence, ordered a new trial 58
The factual situation in Boteler concerning the disclosure request
was similar to the one in Brady. In Boteler the defense counsel requested before the trial, that the state submit all statements made by
the defendant. The prosecutor failed to disclose either to the defense
counsel or to the trial judge "notes of a lengthy statement made by
defendant to a State's witness." 5' At trial, the statement and the
witness's testimony were used to attack the defendant's credibility.
On an appeal based upon this nondisclosure the Mississippi Supreme
Court refused to find a due process violation."'
The Agurs standard required that Boteler be granted a new trial.
First, the request by his counsel was more than a request for all exculpatory material or all "Brady material," it was a specific request
for all statements made by the defendant in the state's possession. 6'
Secondly, the request in Boteler was even more specific than the request in Brady, wherein the Supreme Court found a due process violation in the prosecution's failure to disclose certain evidence. Therefore, the failure of the prosecution in Boteler to allow the trial judge
an opportunity to inspect the evidence, whether it proved to be ex-

"Id. at 112-13.
s"363 So. 2d at 279.
s"373 U.S. at 86, 90. The new trial was restricted to the issue of punishment.
"363 So. 2d at 283.
"Id. at 285.
"See note 3,supra.
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culpatory or inculpatory, prior to trial constitutes a violation of due
62
process.
CONCLUSION

The holding in this case indicates that the Mississippi Supreme
Court in the future will continue to focus on the guilt or innocence of
a defendant, rather than on the procedural aspects of the trial. The
court expressly rejected the argument that the standard of review
"should focus on the impact of the undisclosed evidence on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial."3 Instead, the court attempted to
determine whether the suppressed evidence would have changed the
outcome of the jury trial. The criticism of using such a test is that it
can weaken the defendant's procedural rights. These procedural
rights are necessary to protect a defendant from the substantially
greater investigative power of the state. This superior power is
evidenced most clearly in the govenment's ability to uncover information concerning the alleged crime.
In order to correct this inequality, the procedural rights of a defendant and the defendant's ability to adequately prepare his defense
must be recognized. Only if the courts are willing to declare a new
trial, when these rights are violated, will the prosecution be motivated
to recognize its disclosure requirements. Furthermore, the element of
"surprise" in the criminal trial process must be minimized if the
defendant is to be accorded a fair trial. Otherwise, the result will be
that a defendant's procedural rights will become merely symbolic,
rather than defining specific rights and duties.
Marcus M. Wilson
"Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court held that "the pretrial discovery order did not
require the prosecution to deliver the notes." Id.
"363 So. 2d at 285.

